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I. INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration is a frequently utilized,1 expeditious and cost-effective 
alternative to litigation.2  While additional advantages of arbitration 
include privacy, specialized arbitrator expertise and party control over 
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 1 International Centre for Dispute Resolution, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28819 
(last visited Dec. 27, 2008). 
 2 9 US NITA prec § 1; American Arbitration Association, http: 
www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=28749 (last visited Dec. 27, 2008). 
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the process,3 the most important feature of arbitration, and indeed, the 
key to its success, is the public’s confidence and trust in the integrity of 
the process.4  However, such confidence and trust is undermined when an 
arbitration award is vacated for arbitrator evident partiality.  Arbitrator 
evident partiality, which is listed under the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”)5 as one ground for vacatur of an arbitration award,6 
encompasses both an arbitrator’s explicit bias toward one party and an 
arbitrator’s inferred bias when an arbitrator fails to disclose relevant 
information to the parties.7  Arbitrator evident partiality is particularly 
problematic because it is difficult to concretely define arbitrator evident 
partiality, the standards for interpreting arbitrator evident partiality lack 
consistency, and, furthermore, it is a frequently used basis for vacatur 
under Section 10(a)(2).8 
The FAA does not explicitly define evident partiality, and as a 
result, the standards for what constitutes evident partiality are vague and 
oftentimes conflicting.9  There are at least three judicial interpretations 
regarding evident partiality: (1) an “appearance of partiality” standard, 
(2) an “actual partiality” or bias standard, and (3) a “reasonable 
impression of partiality” middle-ground standard.10  However, courts 
                                                                                                             
 3 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). See MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: ARBITRATION AND ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 12 (1995). 
 4 See Richard Chernick & Kimberly Taylor, Ethical Issues Specific to Arbitration, in 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION ETHICS: A Comprehensive Guide 181 (Phyllis Bernard et al. eds., 
2004) (noting that “Canon I of the ABA/AAA Code of Ethics recognizes that for 
commercial arbitration to be effective the public must have confidence in the integrity 
and fairness of the process.”). 
 5 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2000). 
 6 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2000). The other three grounds are: (i) corruption, fraud, or 
undue means; (ii) arbitrator misconduct or misbehavior; or (iii) where the arbitrators 
exceeded their powers. 
 7 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 138 (2008). See Jill Gross, 
Grounds to Challenge FINRA Arbitrators (Working Paper Series, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1504110. 
 8 See 9 US NITA prec § 1 (noting that vacatur under § 10 is where most battles are 
fought; vacatur under § 10(a)(2) frequently turns on the undisclosed bias of an arbitrator 
and “whether that bias was substantial enough to taint the award”). For an illustrative 
example of a finding of evident partiality on the part of the arbitrator, see Morelite 
Constr. Corp. v. New York District Council Carpenters Benefit Funds, 748 F.2d 79 (2d 
Cir. 1984) (evident partiality found where there was a father-son relationship between the 
arbitrator and an officer of one of the parties to the dispute). 
 9 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 138 (2008). 
 10 Id. The three interpretations are: (1) that arbitrators are expected to be “completely 
impartial,” with absolutely “no connection with the parties or the dispute involved which 
might give the appearance of partiality” unless otherwise agreed to by the parties; (2) that 
“an appearance of bias” will only disqualify an arbitrator where an arbitrator exhibits 
some sort of personal interest, e.g., a pecuniary interest; and (3) that a “reasonable 
impression of partiality” establishes when an arbitrator possesses a duty to disclose 
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have construed these three standards in a variety of fashions and, as a 
result, there is presently no uniformity regarding the definition of evident 
partiality.11 
Without a precise definition of arbitrator evident partiality, the 
implications for vacatur predicated upon evident partiality are serious.12  
First, the issue of remedy is far from certain.  The FAA does not mandate 
or compel certain action once an award is vacated.13  The statute 
indicates that if an award is vacated within the timeframe prescribed by 
the arbitration agreement for an award to be rendered, then a court “may, 
in its discretion,” order a rehearing on the matter.14  Where bias, fraud, 
corruption, or other misconduct is involved, courts often remand to a 
new arbitrator.15  Conversely, if the relevant timeframe in the agreement 
has lapsed, then the issue of remedy becomes even less clear, as the FAA 
is completely silent on that point.16  Even if a court remands to a different 
arbitrator, the parties still face another arbitration proceeding.  Thus, the 
vacated award ultimately fails to resolve a given dispute; the parties are 
in court and basically have to start at the beginning of the arbitration 
process. Second, a vacated award has broader implications: if the public 
does not have confidence in the finality of an award, then the integrity of 
the process is compromised.17  More to the point, if the public does not 
have confidence in the fairness and impartial nature of an arbitration 
proceeding, then the integrity of the process as a whole is similarly 
undermined. 
This Comment suggests a way to ease the confusion regarding the 
definition of arbitrator evident partiality and to also reinforce the public’s 
perception of the integrity of the arbitration process by imposing an 
                                                                                                             
(further noting that arbitrator evident partiality consists of a “middle ground” between the 
“appearance of bias” standard and the “actual bias” standard). Id. 
 11 See supra note 10 and infra Part II. 
 12 See David Allen Larson, Conflicts of Interest and Disclosures: Are We Making a 
Mountain Out of a Molehill?, 49 S. TEX. L. REV. 879, 882–83 (2008) (indicating that 
vacatur based on an arbitrator’s failure to disclose a conflict of interest is captured by the 
acronym “WAFAA”: the “Worst Alternative to a Final Arbitration Award” and noting 
that vacatur is a “catastrophic consequence[] of failing to disclose”). 
 13 See William H. Hardie, Arbitration: Post-Award Procedures, 60 ALA. L. REV. 314, 
324 (1999). 
 14 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2000). 
 15 In re: A.H. Robins Co. v. Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust, 1999 230 B.R. 82, 86 
(E.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2009). 
 16 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (2000). See William H. Hardie, supra note 13. 
 17 See MARTIN DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 15 (2002) (contending that the 
advantages of arbitration are lost once any aspect of the arbitration is challenged in 
court). See also Chernick & Taylor, supra note 4, at 179 (noting that “it is essential that 
the arbitration process be fair and the arbitrator impartial. It is also important that the 
parties have confidence in the integrity of the process.”). 
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affirmative duty to investigate on an arbitrator.  Stated simply, an 
arbitrator should have a legally independent affirmative duty to run a 
conflict check prior to the commencement of an arbitration and disclose 
the results to the parties.  This will allow the parties to make an informed 
decision as to the arbitrator’s partiality, thereby minimizing the risk of 
award vacatur for arbitrator evident partiality.  Whether or not this duty 
is met will be judged by an objective standard. 
This affirmative duty to investigate will minimize the focus on 
actual and/or constructive knowledge—what an arbitrator knows, should 
know, or might potentially know based upon the actions an arbitrator did 
take or should have taken in order to make an adequate disclosure.  
While the determination of actual knowledge may be objective, assessing 
constructive knowledge is inherently subjective. Instead of trying to 
evaluate an arbitrator’s subjective state of mind, the process of 
arbitration will be better served by the imposition of an affirmative duty 
on an arbitrator to investigate potential conflicts and disclose the results 
of the investigation.  Such a free-standing duty would eliminate the need 
for conducting a subjective balancing test to measure the sufficiency of a 
disclosure.  While one could contend that an additional step in the 
arbitration process is not needed, the judicial response to arbitrator 
evident partiality clearly indicates that an additional step is most 
assuredly needed. 
Part II will explore the pillar of the doctrine, the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co. 
Setting forth an “impression of possible bias” standard,18 the opinion is 
fraught with ambiguities concerning the nature and scope of evident 
partiality.  Part III will give an overview of subsequent judicial 
interpretations of evident partiality, with particular emphasis placed on 
the Second and Ninth Circuit’s divergent approaches.  While the Second 
and the Ninth Circuits both employ subjective reasonableness 
standards,19 the two circuits differ in the context of an affirmative duty to 
investigate possible conflicts of interest.  Although the Second Circuit 
                                                                                                             
 18 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) (plurality 
opinion). 
 19 The Second Circuit utilizes a “reasonable person” standard, whereas the Ninth 
Circuit utilizes a “reasonable impression of partiality” standard. See infra note 51. The 
Third Circuit utilizes a “‘reasonably construed’ bias standard”, which is functionally 
equivalent to the Second and Ninth Circuits’ standard. See HSM Constr. Servs., Inc. v. 
MDC Systems, Inc., No. 06-2584, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 16964, at **10 (3d Cir. July 
16, 2007) (citing Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 19 F.3d 1503, 1523 n.30 (3d 
Cir. 1994), aff’d, 514 U.S. 938 (1995)) (noting that the “First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the reasonably construed bias 
standard, albeit not under that name.”). 
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has refused to impose a free-standing affirmative duty to investigate 
potential conflicts, it does, under certain circumstances, impose on an 
arbitrator a duty to take some action.20  Conversely, the Ninth Circuit is 
more willing to explicitly impose an affirmative duty on an arbitrator to 
investigate and disclose a potential conflict.21  Part IV will examine 
several sets of model guidelines to aid in the analysis of imposing a duty 
to investigate on an arbitrator.  These guidelines have been promulgated 
by both domestic and international arbitration bodies, including the 
American Bar Association / American Arbitration Association’s Code of 
Ethics and the International Bar Association’s Guidelines on Conflicts of 
Interest of International Arbitration.  Finally, Part V will posit that these 
various issues warrant a reexamination of the arbitrator’s duty 
throughout the arbitration process.  In light of the divergent judicial 
interpretations of evident partiality, a new approach to the arbitrator 
impartiality calculus is needed.  An affirmative free-standing duty to 
investigate will help reinforce the notion of party self-determinism, 
meaning the parties themselves should evaluate an arbitrator’s partiality 
instead of the arbitrator himself or herself.  The imposition of an 
affirmative duty to investigate on an arbitrator, similar to the Ninth 
Circuit’s approach, could alleviate much of the current ambiguity and 
uncertainty that exists throughout the various courts. 
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENT PARTIALITY 
In order to comprehend the universe of arbitrator evident partiality, 
it is necessary to first consider where the uncertainty all began: the 
Supreme Court’s 1968 opinion in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. 
Continental Casualty Co.22  In this case, the Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of whether impartiality, a requirement for every judicial 
proceeding, applied to an arbitration dispute.23  Although the Court 
provided an affirmative answer, the opinion was an unclear delineation 
of the standard for evident partiality.24 
The underlying matter involved a dispute between a subcontractor 
and a prime contractor for a painting job.25  The contract between the two 
                                                                                                             
 20 Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 
F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 21 New Regency Prod., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., 501 F.3d 1101, 1109 (9th 
Cir. 2007). 
 22 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968) (plurality 
opinion). For a discussion of whether Justice Black’s opinion was in fact a plurality 
opinion, see infra note 38. 
 23 Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 145 (plurality opinion). 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. at 146. 
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parties contained an arbitration agreement.26  Pursuant to the agreement, 
the petitioner appointed one of the arbitrators, the respondent appointed a 
second arbitrator, and then the two selected arbitrators appointed the 
third and final arbitrator.27  The third arbitrator had a large business and 
served as a consultant for individuals regarding building construction 
projects.28  The prime contractor-respondent was one of the third 
arbitrator’s “regular customers,”29 despite the two parties having had 
what the Court deemed a “sporadic” relationship.30  Although the 
arbitrator had not conducted any business dealings with the prime 
contractor for approximately one year prior to the commencement of the 
arbitration proceeding, the prime contractor paid the arbitrator a 
significant amount of money over a four to five year time span and even 
rendered services on the projects involved in the underlying lawsuit.31  
An arbitration proceeding took place, but the “close business 
connections” between the arbitrator and the prime contractor were not 
known by the petitioner, nor were they revealed by anyone until after the 
award had already been rendered.32  The petitioner challenged the award, 
but the District Court refused to vacate, and the Court of Appeals 
subsequently affirmed the award.33  Both courts concluded that the FAA 
did not support vacatur of the award.34  The Supreme Court granted 
certiorari35 and reversed, thus vacating the award.36 
The plurality opinion,37 authored by Justice Black, adopted an 
elusive “impression of bias” standard.38  Attempting to “safeguard the 
impartiality of arbitrators,” the Court held that arbitrators must disclose 
                                                                                                             
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 146 (plurality opinion). 
 29 Id. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 382 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1967). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 390 U.S. 979 (1968). 
 36 Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 146–47. 
 37 Much debate has revolved around whether Justice Black wrote for a plurality or a 
majority of the Court. See Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage 
Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 282 (5th Cir. 2007) (“A majority of circuit courts have concluded 
that Justice White’s [concurring] opinion did not lend majority status to the plurality 
opinion.”); Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO, 960 S.W.2d 629, 633 (Tex. 1997) (“Although 
Justices White and Marshall joined fully in Justice Black’s opinion for the Court, some 
lower federal courts have purported to see a conflict between the two writings. By 
treating Justice Black’s opinion as a mere plurality, they have felt free to reject the 
suggestion that ‘evident partiality’ is met by an ‘appearance of bias,’ and to apply a much 
narrower standard.”). 
 38 Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 149. 
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to the parties “any dealings that might create an impression of possible 
bias.”39  Under this standard, any connection or relationship an arbitrator 
has that might give rise to an “impression of possible bias” must be 
disclosed to the parties in order to preclude a finding of evident partiality 
sufficient to warrant award vacatur.40  The Court recognized that 
arbitrators are inherently part of the business world; however, because of 
the special position arbitrators occupy in a disputed matter, with their 
authorization to decide the law and are free from appellate review, the 
Court imposed a high standard of impartiality on arbitrators.41  In the 
plurality opinion’s final paragraph, the Court opined that underlying this 
standard of evident partiality is “the premise that any tribunal permitted 
by law to try cases and controversies not only must be unbiased but also 
must avoid even the appearance of bias.”42 
Justice White, along with Justice Marshall, joined in the decision 
but wrote a separate concurring opinion to make what he referred to as 
                                                                                                             
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. (emphasis added). 
 41 Id. Essentially, the plurality imposed on arbitrators the same standard of 
impartiality applicable for Article III judges. 28 U.S.C. § 455 sets forth the judicial 
standard of impartiality. § 455(a) states that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate 
[magistrate judge] . . . shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned.”  § 455(b) enumerates the situations in which a judge 
must disqualify himself. This includes “[w]here he has a personal bias or prejudice 
concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 
proceeding” as well as where “[h]e knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his 
spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject 
matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be 
substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding” and where “[h]e or his spouse, 
or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them . . . [i]s a party to the 
proceeding” or “[i]s acting as a lawyer in the proceeding.”  28 U.S.C. § 455 (2008). 
Judge Wiener, who concurred in Judge Reavley’s dissent in Positive Software Solutions, 
Inc., emphasized the differences between an Article III judge and an arbitrator. Positive 
Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century Mortgage Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 
2007) (Wiener, J., dissenting). Judge Wiener noted that, unlike an Article III judge, an 
arbitrator is selected not by an “objectively random or blind assignment through long 
established court procedures” but by the parties themselves. Id. As such, Judge Wiener 
posited that the parties alone have the “sole authority and duty to determine whether a 
candidate for the post of arbitrator should be accepted or rejected.”  Id. In order to make 
an informed determination, Judge Wiener concludes that an arbitrator must disclose to 
the parties “every relationship [no matter how “tenuous or remote”], without self-
abridgement by the potential arbitrator . . . [f]iltration of partiality in arbitration is the 
exclusive prerogative and duty of the parties . . . [a]s gatekeepers, the parties are charged 
with guarding against favoritism and prejudice, a duty that they cannot possibly discharge 
in the absence of total disclosure.”  Id. 
 42 Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 150. It is implicitly assumed that the 
“appearance of bias” language from the last paragraph reflects the functional equivalent 
of the “impression of possible bias” standard. However, it is arguable that there is a 
difference between the two phrases, thus demonstrating why the Court’s precise holding 
in Commonwealth Coatings is hard to discern. 
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“additional remarks.”43  Unfortunately, this concurring opinion created 
additional confusion as to what constitutes the applicable standard of 
evident partiality.44 Justice White attempted to limit the scope of evident 
partiality to instances where an arbitrator has a “substantial interest” in 
the dispute before disclosure is required.45  In Justice White’s opinion, 
arbitrators should not automatically be disqualified from an arbitration 
proceeding because of a business relationship where both parties are 
aware of the relationship in advance, or where the parties are unaware of 
the circumstances but the relationship is trivial.46  However, in the event 
that the arbitrator has a “substantial interest” in the transaction at hand, 
such information must be disclosed.47 
Combining the “impression of possible bias” standard with an 
unclear definition as to what constitutes “substantial interest,” the 
Court’s evident partiality framework has failed to provide courts with 
much guidance in handling arbitrator evident partiality.  The ensuing 
result is a fact-sensitive, case-by-case inquiry into each dispute with little 
predictability as to future outcomes.48 
III. CURRENT JUDICIAL APPROACHES TO EVIDENT PARTIALITY 
Courts have subsequently grappled with how to resolve the 
imprecise standard of evident partiality arising out of Commonwealth 
                                                                                                             
 43 Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 150 (White, J., concurring). 
 44 See, e.g., Schmitz v. Zilveti, 20 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that “the 
majority did not articulate a succinct standard”). 
 45 Commonwealth Coatings Corp., 393 U.S. at 151 (White, J., concurring). [If you 
are going to use the short name, then you should be consistent throughout.] 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. at 151–52. 
 48 See Ann Ryan Robertson, Feature, International Arbitration in the U.S.: Evident 
Partiality Based on Nondisclosure: Betwixt and Between, 45 HOUSTON LAWYER 22, 23 
(2007) (noting that the “confusion in the Commonwealth Coatings opinion gave lower 
courts little guidance, and most courts struggled with the import of Justice White’s 
concurrence . . . There is no consensus among the circuits, but the test that has emerged 
can best be characterized as a case-by-case objective inquiry into partiality or a 
reasonable impression of bias standard.”)  See also Judge Wiener’s dissent in Positive 
Software Solutions, Inc. (differentiating between disclosure and disqualification of an 
arbitrator; emphasizing that “Justice White did not ‘remark’ that the differences between 
the standards of decorum applicable to judges and those to which arbitrators are held has 
anything at all to do with the immutable prerequisite that, before the parties sign off on a 
candidate for arbitrator, they must have received from him an unexpurgated disclosure of 
absolutely every past or present relationship with the parties and their lawyers”; and 
further noting that “Justice White’s remark that disqualification is not automatic for 
minor business relationships is simply inapposite to the requirement of full disclosure of 
every relationship, large and small.”) Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century 
Mortgage Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2007) (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
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Coatings.49  The differing approaches of the Second and Ninth Circuits 
in regard to evident partiality are particularly illustrative of such 
divergence in judicial interpretation and application.50  While both courts 
appear to employ an evident partiality standard based upon 
reasonableness, the two courts differ in their willingness to impose any 
affirmative duty to investigate on the arbitrator. 
A.  The Second Circuit’s Approach 
The Second Circuit addressed the issue of evident partiality in 
Morelite Construction Corp. v. New York District Council Carpenters 
Benefit Funds.51  In this landmark case, the appellant challenged an 
arbitration award because the arbitrator’s father served as a prominent 
figure within one of the appellees’ corporate hierarchies.52  Finding that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth Coatings did not 
resolve the issue of what constitutes evident partiality, the court noted 
that it was left with “little guidance” in applying the correct standard for 
evident partiality under Section 10 of the FAA.53 
The court recognized Justice Black’s “appearance of bias” standard, 
but found it irreconcilable with Justice White’s concurrence.54  Positing 
that most of the plurality’s opinion must therefore be interpreted as dicta, 
the court set about resolving the issue of what standard satisfies evident 
partiality.55  The court concluded that an “appearance of bias” standard 
was too low to satisfy the evident partiality standard, since arbitration 
often involves a “trade-off” between arbitrator impartiality and expertise 
on one hand, and the fact that arbitration is voluntary in nature on the 
                                                                                                             
 49 See Burlington N. R.R. v. TUCO, 960 S.W. 2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1997) (noting that 
state courts are “divided between the broader [evident partiality] view reflected by 
Schmitz and the narrower view of Morelite”). 
 50 Compare Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 84 (adopting a “reasonable person” 
standard of evident partiality) and Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine 
Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132, 138 (2d Cir. 2007) (reinforcing its “reasonable 
person” standard of evident partiality; also, finding no affirmative duty per se, but when 
an arbitrator thinks that there might be a nontrivial conflict of interest, the arbitrator must 
either investigate the potential conflict or disclose his reasoning for why there might 
potentially be a conflict and his intention not to investigate into the matter) with Schmitz, 
20 F.3d at 1046 (adopting a “reasonable impression of partiality” standard and suggesting 
that an arbitrator might have an affirmative duty to investigate) and New Regency, 501 
F.3d at 1101 (implied affirmative duty to investigate). 
 51 Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 79. 
 52 Id. at 81. 
 53 Id. at 82–83. 
 54 Id. at 83. The court read Justice White’s concurrence as holding arbitrators to a 
distinctly lower standard than the plurality opinion and thus stated that “[f]our justices . . . 
do not constitute a majority of the Supreme Court.”  Id. 
 55 Id. 
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other hand.56  The court also concluded that the “proof of actual bias” 
standard was too high, for partiality would be hard, if not impossible, to 
prove.57  As a result, the court adopted a “reasonable person” standard, 
whereby “evident partiality . . . will be found where a reasonable person 
would have to conclude that an arbitrator was partial to one party to the 
arbitration.”58 
In Morelite, the court focused on the father-son relationship, and 
without knowing more details about the relationship itself, vacated the 
award for evident partiality.59  Despite indicating that “[w]e know 
nothing more about the relationship” between the father and son, the 
court concluded that “we are bound by our strong feeling that sons are 
more often than not loyal to their fathers, partial to their fathers, and 
biased on behalf of their fathers.”60 
The Second Circuit revisited evident partiality in Applied Industrial 
Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S.61  This case 
involved an arbitrator who had purposefully constructed a “Chinese 
Wall”62 to shield himself from learning about any contract negotiations 
between a division of his company and the appellant’s parent 
corporation.63  The court vacated the award because the arbitrator knew, 
at a minimum, that a potential conflict of interest existed; yet, he failed to 
either investigate the matter or to disclose the existence of the “Chinese 
Wall” to the parties.64 
The court reiterated its “reasonable person” standard and also added 
an additional burden on arbitrators—the duty to investigate.65  The court 
first posited that “arbitrators must take steps to ensure that the parties are 
not misled into believing that no nontrivial conflict exists.”66  Then, the 
court held that if an arbitrator thinks that a “nontrivial conflict of interest 
                                                                                                             
 56 Morelite Constr. Corp., 748 F.2d at 84. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 135. 
 62 A “Chinese Wall,” also termed an “ethical wall,” is defined as “a screening 
mechanism that protects a client from a conflict of interest by preventing one or more 
lawyers within an organization from participating in any matter involving the client.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  The party relying on the “Chinese Wall” 
bears the burden of demonstrating its effectiveness. 7 AM. JUR. 2D Attorneys at Law § 
189 (2008) (referencing Howitt v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. App. 4th 1574 (Cal. App. 4th 
1992). 
 63 Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 135. 
 64 Id. The court did mention in a footnote that it was unprepared to conclude that a 
“Chinese Wall” was an insufficient substitute for investigation. 
 65 Id. at 137–38. 
 66 Id.  
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might exist,” the arbitrator must either (i) conduct an investigation into 
the potential conflict, or (ii) disclose to the parties why he or she thinks 
there could be a conflict.67  Further, the arbitrator must disclose his intent 
not to investigate the matter.68  The court emphatically rejected the 
notion that it was creating a free-standing per se affirmative duty to 
investigate.69  The court stated that an arbitrator’s failure to investigate is 
insufficient to vacate an arbitration award; however, evident partiality 
arises when the arbitrator is aware of a potential conflict and fails to 
either investigate the matter or inform the parties of his intent not to 
investigate.70  Thus, knowledge of a potential conflict triggers either the 
duty to investigate or the duty to disclose that the arbitrator will not 
investigate. 
Because the court focused almost exclusively on the disclosure 
aspect of its evident partiality standard and failed to confront the duty to 
investigate directly, its opinion sends mixed signals regarding the 
applicable duty to investigate standard.  The court explicitly stated that it 
was not creating an affirmative duty to investigate; however, the court 
also emphasized that, had the arbitrator conducted an investigation into 
the possible conflict, he would have found that a relationship between his 
company and the plaintiff’s parent corporation “already existed” and, 
even more importantly, that the relationship had resulted in a significant 
amount of revenue.71  Furthermore, the court’s standard was premised on 
the notion that even the mere possibility of a nontrivial conflict of 
interest triggers an arbitrator’s duty to take some affirmative action: 
either investigate or disclose the arbitrator’s intent not to investigate the 
matter.  Thus, while the court stated that it did not intend to create an 
affirmative duty to investigate, it is arguable that the court did create 
some type of duty by requiring that the arbitrator take affirmative action 
where there might be some potential conflict of interest.  After all, the 
court’s impartiality standard is not satisfied simply because an arbitrator 
sincerely thought that no conflict of interest initially existed.72  If an 
arbitrator possesses a continuing duty to disclose conflicts, subsequent 
events can trigger the arbitrator’s duty to either conduct an additional 
                                                                                                             
 67 Id. (emphasis added). 
 68 Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 137–138. 
 69 Id. at 135 (“We emphasize that we are not creating a free-standing duty to 
investigate.”). 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 139. 
 72 Id. (“[A]s Commonwealth Coatings and Morelite make clear, subjective good faith 
is not the test.”). 
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investigation into potential conflicts or disclose his or her intent not to 
investigate. 73 
Following the Second Circuit’s holdings in Morelite and Applied 
Industrial Materials Corp., an arbitrator has a duty to ensure that the 
parties to a dispute do not think that there is not a conflict of interest, or 
at least, that there is no nontrivial conflict of interest.74  In order to 
discharge that burden, an arbitrator who thinks that a “nontrivial conflict 
of interest might exist[]”75 must either investigate the possible conflict or 
disclose why he thinks there might be a conflict of interest and explain 
his intent not to investigate into the matter.76 
B.  The Ninth Circuit’s Approach 
The Ninth Circuit first addressed the conundrum of applying 
Commonwealth Coatings’ evident partiality standard in Schmitz v. 
Zilveti.77  In this case, a dispute was submitted to arbitration under the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (the “NASD”).78  Three 
arbitrators were selected to hear the matter.79  One of the arbitrators 
failed to run a conflict check on the appellee’s parent company—a 
company his law firm had represented on numerous occasions.80  The 
appellants challenged the arbitration award.81  The district court 
concluded that an arbitrator is required to disclose only the facts that he 
or she is aware of at the time of the proceeding, and since the arbitrator 
did not know of his firm’s conflict of interest, the district court 
concluded that the arbitrator’s lack of knowledge did not establish 
evident partiality.82  On appeal, the court vacated the panel’s award.83  
The court looked at prior Ninth Circuit cases involving actual bias and 
adopted a “reasonable impression of partiality” standard, deeming it to 
be the most accurate expression of the Commonwealth Coatings 
standard.84  The court drew a distinction between cases involving an 
arbitrator’s nondisclosure of potential conflicts and those cases of actual 
                                                                                                             
 73 Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 139. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 139 (emphasis added). 
 76 Id. 
 77 Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1043. 
 78 Id. at 1044. See also infra note 93. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. The arbitrator’s law firm had represented the party’s parent company in at least 
nineteen cases over a time span of thirty-five years. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1044–45. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 1046 (quoting Middlesex Mut. Ins. Co. v. Levine, 675 F.2d 1197, 1201 (11th 
Cir. 1982)). 
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arbitrator bias.85  In the former situation, the court indicated that a 
“reasonable impression of partiality” standard suffices because, as a 
policy matter, the parties are supposed to select the arbitrator 
“intelligently,” and they can do so “only when facts showing potential 
partiality are disclosed.”86 
The court went beyond merely articulating its standard of evident 
partiality, however, and explicitly imposed an affirmative duty to 
investigate in “certain circumstances”87—without concisely defining 
which circumstances gave rise to such an affirmative duty.88  The Ninth 
Circuit distinguished this duty to investigate from Commonwealth 
Coatings’ duty to disclose, and stated that a failure to investigate could 
give rise to a “reasonable impression of partiality.”89  The court reasoned 
that even an arbitrator’s constructive knowledge of a conflict can give 
rise to a “reasonable impression of partiality.”90 
In the case at hand, the procedural rules of the NASD Code 
governed the dispute.91  Under the NASD Code, an arbitrator should 
investigate potential conflicts of interest.92  As the arbitrator in the 
dispute failed to investigate his law firm’s prior representation of one of 
the appellee’s parent companies, the court concluded that the arbitrator’s 
constructive knowledge established evident partiality.93  The court, 
recalling that the parties themselves are the judges of arbitrator 
partiality,94 specifically stated that the imposition of an affirmative duty 
to investigate encourages candor and honest disclosure of information 
that an arbitrator might otherwise be inclined to keep secret from the 
parties.95  The court opined that the dual duties of investigation and 
                                                                                                             
 85 Id. at 1047. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1048 (emphasis added). 
 88 The court did note that “the parties can expect a lawyer/arbitrator to investigate 
and disclose conflicts he has with actual parties to the arbitration.” Id. (citing Close v. 
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., 486 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985)). 
 89 Id. at 1047–48. 
 90 Id. at 1048 (“That the lawyer forgot to run a conflict check or had forgotten that he 
had previously represented the party is not an excuse.”). 
 91 Id. at 1044. 
 92 Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1044 (“The NASD Code . . . requires arbitrators to make an 
investigation regarding potential conflicts of interest. NASD Code section 23(b) 
provides: “Persons who are requested to accept appointment as arbitrators should make a 
reasonable effort to inform themselves of any interests or relationships described in 
Paragraph (a) above.”) (emphasis added). 
 93 Id. at 1048–49. 
 94 See Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 393 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) 
(plurality opinion). 
 95 Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1048. 
204 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 6:191 
disclosure “must be enforced, even if later a court finds that no actual 
bias was present.”96 
While the court’s imposition of an affirmative duty to investigate is 
a useful tool for ensuring that arbitrators are impartial to the proceedings 
at hand, its framework lacks definition, for it did not articulate 
specifically that arbitrators have a blanket duty to investigate potential 
conflicts.  Indeed, the court did not define when arbitrators have such a 
duty, or for that matter, that all arbitrators inherently possess that duty by 
virtue of their position as arbitrators.  The court only stated that 
arbitrators are required “in certain circumstances” to conduct an 
investigation.97  Although the court did not elaborate on what constitutes 
“certain circumstances,” or conversely, when an arbitrator does not have 
a duty to investigate, the court did indicate that when potential partiality 
is the issue, “no such imputation can arise.”98  Thus, while the court did 
not adopt a per se rule that every arbitrator in every circumstance must 
independently undertake an investigation into possible conflicts of 
interest, the court’s language seems to indicate that it is theoretically 
inclined to adopt such a position in the future.99 
The Ninth Circuit recently revisited the issue and similarly imposed 
an affirmative duty on an arbitrator to investigate and disclose a potential 
conflict.  In New Regency Productions, Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, 
Inc., the court affirmed the vacatur of an arbitration award where the 
arbitrator failed to investigate and disclose possible conflicts arising from 
his acceptance of employment with a film group currently in negotiations 
with the appellant corporation.100  The court referenced its holding in 
Schmitz and restated that it utilized a “reasonable impression of 
partiality” standard.101  Again noting that evident partiality can exist 
despite an arbitrator’s actual knowledge of a conflict, the court explained 
that an arbitrator “may have a duty to investigate independent of [his] . . . 
duty to disclose.”102  Furthermore, the court noted that the arbitrator in 
Schmitz had a duty to investigate, and as the arbitrator failed to discharge 
his burden, his constructive knowledge of a conflict gave rise to evident 
                                                                                                             
 96 Id. at 1049. 
 97 Id. at 1048 (emphasis added). 
 98 Id. (quoting Justice White’s concurrence in Commonwealth Coatings). 
 99 Id. at 1049. For instance, the court stated that “[i]f the parties are to be judges of 
the arbitrators’ partiality, duties to investigate and disclose conflicts must be enforced, 
even if a later court finds that no actual bias was present” (citing Close v. Motorists Mut. 
Ins. Co., 486 N.E.2d 1275, 1278–79 (Ohio Ct. App. 1985)). 
 100 New Regency, 501 F.3d at 1111. 
 101 Id. at 1106. 
 102 Id. (citing Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1048). 
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partiality.103  The court, noting that it did not adopt a per se rule in 
Schmitz whereby arbitrators possess a duty to investigate “in all cases,” 
nevertheless held that the arbitrator in the case at hand did have an 
affirmative duty to investigate when he accepted employment during the 
course of the arbitration proceeding.104 
To arrive at its conclusion, the court cited the Second Circuit’s 
decision in Applied Industrial Materials Corp. for the proposition that an 
arbitrator’s constructive knowledge could satisfy evident partiality.105  
Then, the court noted that while the Second Circuit explicitly declined to 
impose an affirmative duty to investigate, the Second Circuit requires an 
arbitrator, who believes that there might be a conflict of interest, to either 
investigate into the matter or disclose his intent not to investigate.106  The 
court also examined a citation in Applied Industrial Materials Corp.,107 
which noted that while the Fourth Circuit did not impose a blanket duty 
to investigate, the Fourth Circuit “suggested that should the arbitrator fail 
to perform due diligence in identifying conflicts,” evident partiality could 
warrant vacatur.108  After elaborating on the Second Circuit’s decision in 
Applied Industrial Materials Corp. and noting that the court knew of 
only one appellate court that has a “per se rule” that an arbitrator’s lack 
of actual knowledge precludes evident partiality,109 the Ninth Circuit 
found that the situation at hand paralleled the matter facing the Second 
Circuit.  As such, the arbitrator should have investigated potential 
conflicts prior to accepting the new employment.110  The court concluded 
that the arbitrator had constructive knowledge of a potential conflict 
when he accepted an executive position with a company in the same 
industry as the parties to the arbitration.111  Therefore, the arbitrator 
should have investigated any potential conflicts.112 
                                                                                                             
 103 Id. at 1107. 
 104 Id. at 1109. 
 105 New Regency, 501 F.3d at 1108 (citing Applied Indus. Materials Corp. v. Ovalar 
Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, A.S., 492 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2007)). 
 106 Id. 
 107 ANR Coal Co. v Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc., 173 F.3d 493 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 108 New Regency, 501 F.3d at 1109 (noting that “[t]he court declined to recognize that 
an arbitrator has a general duty to investigate, but suggested that should the arbitrator fail 
to perform due diligence in identifying conflicts, an undiscovered, ‘not trivial’ conflict 
may result in vacatur.”). 
 109 Gianelli Money Purchase Plan & Trust v. ADM Investor Servs., Inc., 146 F.3d 
1309, 1313 (11th Cir. 1998). 
 110 New Regency, 501 F.3d at 1109. 
 111 Id. (citing Applied Industrial Materials Corp. v. Ovalar Makine Ticaret Ve Sanayi, 
A.S., the court explained that “[w]e believe that his decision to accept a new high-level 
executive job at a company in the same industry as the parties during the arbitration is 
precisely the type of situation ‘where an arbitrator has reason to believe that a nontrivial 
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The court also noted that the arbitration proceeding was governed 
by the American Film Marketing Association (“AFMA”).113  Under the 
AFMA arbitral rules, an arbitrator is required to disclose any 
circumstances that might evince partiality according to either the 
procedural law of the place of arbitration or, if none is indicated, in 
accordance with the laws of California.114  Under California law, an 
arbitrator in an international arbitration matter possesses an ongoing 
obligation to disclose any information which might raise doubts about 
the arbitrator’s partiality.115  Recognizing that the language does not 
explicitly state that an arbitrator has an affirmative duty to investigate, 
the court concluded that the language “necessarily implicates a duty to 
investigate whether instances of potential conflict exist.”116 
By “implicat[ing] a duty to investigate” despite the existence of any 
“potential conflict,” the court seemingly imposed an affirmative duty on 
an arbitrator to investigate regardless of whether there is an actual, 
potential, or even no conflict.117  The court referenced several arbitral 
guidelines, including the American Arbitration Association and 
American Bar Association Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial 
Disputes and the International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts 
of Interest in International Arbitration, which explicitly posit an 
affirmative duty to investigate.118  While acknowledging that the 
referenced guidelines were not binding,119 the court relied on the 
guidelines, along with “an attorney’s traditional duty to avoid conflicts of 
                                                                                                             
conflict of interest might exist’ and should investigate to determine the existence of 
potential conflicts.”). 
 112 Id. at 1109. 
 113 Id. at 1103, 1109. 
 114 Id. at 1109. The court referenced AFMA Rules for International Arbitration 
Section 6.5. 
 115 New Regency, 501 F.3d. at 1109, 1111 (citing California Code of Civil Procedure 
§§ 1297.121, 1297.13, and 1297.123). 
 116 Id. at 1109 (citing HSMV Corp. v. ADI Ltd., 72 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1129 (C.D. Cal. 
1999), disapproved on other grounds in Fid. Fed. Bank, FSB v. Durga Ma Corp., 386 
F.3d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. at 1109–10 (noting that “Canon II(B) of the code [the American Arbitration 
Association and American Bar Association Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial 
Disputes] . . . provides that arbitrators have an ongoing duty to ‘make a reasonable effort 
to inform themselves of any interests or relationships’ subject to disclosure” and that 
“General Standard 7(c) of the International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of 
Interest in International Arbitration (2004) states that ‘[a]n arbitrator is under a duty to 
make reasonable enquiries to investigate any potential conflicts of interest, as well as any 
facts or circumstances that may cause his or her impartiality or independence to be 
questioned.’”). 
 119 Id. at 1110. However, the court cited Commonwealth Coatings’ treatment of the 
AAA rules as “persuasive authority.” Id. 
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interest” to reinforce its holding in Schmitz that constructive knowledge 
can satisfy evident partiality where an arbitrator fails to investigate 
potential conflicts, and, in general, to impose an affirmative duty to 
investigate.120 
Although the court did not state that it was adopting a per se duty to 
investigate requirement in all arbitration proceedings, the court’s 
opinions in Schmitz and New Regency hint at such a conclusion.  Even if 
one interprets the New Regency decision more narrowly, that is, to hold 
that an arbitrator must investigate potential conflicts when there is a 
change in circumstances, the court has still provided a more useful and 
workable framework for approaching the evident partiality quagmire. 
Coupling Schmitz with New Regency, the Ninth Circuit appears to be 
moving closer to a general affirmative duty to investigate. 
While the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit have interpreted the 
evident partiality standard in a similar fashion, the two circuits diverge in 
their willingness to impose a duty to investigate.  In the Second Circuit, a 
duty to investigate arises only when an arbitrator has some reason to 
think that a “nontrivial conflict of interest”121 might exist.  In that 
particular circumstance, an arbitrator is required to either investigate the 
conflict, or disclose why the arbitrator thinks a conflict might exist and 
his decision not to investigate further.122  Where a potential nontrivial 
conflict of interest exists, an arbitrator’s failure to either investigate or 
disclose his intent to not investigate is sufficient for a finding of evident 
partiality.123  However, an examination of Applied Industrial Materials 
Corp. reveals that the court did create an affirmative duty to act.  For 
instance, an arbitrator cannot simply turn a blind eye to the existence of a 
nontrivial conflict; he or she cannot actively mislead the parties into 
thinking that there is no nontrivial conflict of interest when such a 
conflict does actually exist.124  The Ninth Circuit, on the other hand, 
imposes an affirmative duty to investigate where changed circumstances 
in the course of the arbitration proceeding could result in a potential 
conflict.125 
                                                                                                             
 120 New Regency, 501 F.3d. at 1110. 
 121 Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 138.  
 122 Id. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
 125 See Steven Smith et al., International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 42 INT’L 
LAW 363, 368–69 (2008) (“The Second Circuit’s refusal to impose a free-standing duty 
to investigate seems at odds with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in New Regency, which 
found an affirmative duty to investigate when a change in circumstances could potentially 
create conflicts.”). 
208 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW [Vol. 6:191 
IV. ARBITRATION MODEL GUIDELINES 
In addition to judicial decisions on the arbitrator’s duties, several 
model guidelines hold particular relevance to the matter at hand by 
suggesting an affirmative duty to investigate.  The guidelines are not 
binding as law and hence often take the form of a code of ethics, but they 
are evidence of “soft” law in the field.126  In fact, they could provide an 
additional lens through which to view the evident partiality dilemma, 
which arises due to the disconnect between trying to establish an 
objective standard by which to evaluate arbitrator impartiality and the 
reality that the standard is inherently subjective in nature.  At the core of 
arbitration model rules is the notion that an arbitrator must be and remain 
neutral and impartial.127  However, two noteworthy guidelines do contain 
an affirmative duty to investigate: the American Arbitration Association 
and American Bar Association Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in 
Commercial Disputes (“AAA / ABA Code of Ethics”) and the 
International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest of 
International Arbitration (“IBA Guidelines”).  If one utilizes these 
guidelines in examining evident partiality, it becomes apparent that an 
affirmative duty to investigate could alleviate much of the difficulties 
surrounding domestic and international arbitration. 
A.  The American Arbitration Association / American Bar Association 
Code of Ethics 
Canon II of the AAA / ABA Code of Ethics articulates how an 
arbitrator should conduct himself.  Entitled “An Arbitrator Should 
Disclose Any Interest or Relationship Likely to Affect Impartiality or 
Which Might Create an Appearance of Partiality,” Canon II recommends 
that an arbitrator “should make a reasonable effort to inform [him or 
herself] of any interests or relationships,” including any financial or 
personal interest in the resolution of the proceeding, as well as any 
existing or past relationship which could render a selected neutral 
                                                                                                             
 126 See Mark Kantor, Arbitrator Disclosure: An Active But Unsettled Year, INT. 
A.L.R. 2008, 11(1), 20–32 (noting, for instance, that “[t]he ABA / AAA Code of Ethics 
states that it is non-binding. Still, the AAA requires arbitrators in AAA proceedings, as a 
condition to appointment, to execute an arbitrator’s oath agreeing to follow the Code of 
Ethics’ disclosure obligations.”). 
 127 See, e.g., AAA International Arbitration Rules, which states that “[a]rbitrators 
acting under these Rules shall be impartial and independent.”  Am. Arbitration Ass’n, 
International Arbitration Rules art. 7, P 1 (2008), available at http://adr.org/sp.asp?id= 
33994#INTERNATIONAL%20ARBITRATION%20RULES. 
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impartial.128  While the AAA / ABA Code does not explicitly state that 
there is a free-standing duty to investigate, its does recommend that an 
arbitrator inform him or herself about any possible conflicts, which gives 
rise to the conclusion that there is an affirmative duty to investigate.  In 
fact, one could argue that the duty to disclose inherently triggers a duty 
to investigate129 since an arbitrator cannot effectively disclose that which 
he or she does not know in the first place.  Although the AAA / ABA 
Code of Ethics couches this duty to investigate in terms of a duty to 
disclose, from a practical standpoint, it is illogical that an arbitrator could 
make an effective disclosure absent an investigation.  Ignorance of a 
conflict does not appear to be a sufficient excuse,130 as the AAA / ABA 
Code of Ethics states that an arbitrator’s duty to disclose is a “continuing 
duty” and where there is any uncertainty in whether an arbitrator should 
disclose a possible conflict, “[a]ny doubt . . . should be resolved in favor 
of disclosure.”131 
While useful in its recommendation that an arbitrator investigate 
possible conflicts, the AAA / ABA Code of Ethics is also problematic for 
three main reasons. First, it does not posit that the duty to investigate is a 
free-standing duty apart from the duty to disclose. An examination of 
case law on evident partiality demonstrates that a duty to disclose, absent 
an independent duty to investigate, is simply insufficient to resolve the 
problem at hand.  Second, it notes that the duty to disclose is an ongoing 
duty, but it does not extend that ongoing vigilance in terms of an actual 
investigation.  Third, the AAA / ABA Code’s language is imprecise; 
what exactly constitutes a “reasonable effort” is fairly unspecific and 
open to subjective interpretation.  What is a sufficient effort for one 
arbitrator could very well be insufficient for another arbitrator, all 
depending on the arbitrator’s business, expertise, connections, and 
relationships, etc.  Furthermore, it is unclear when “should” should in 
fact mean “shall” in light of the fact that arbitrators “should make a 
reasonable effort to inform themselves” of any potential conflicts and 
any doubt as to whether to disclose “should be resolved in favor of 
                                                                                                             
 128 Am. Bar Ass’n, The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes Canon 
II(A)–II(B) (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercialdisputes.pdf 
(emphasis added). 
 129 See Larson, supra note 12, at 900 (noting that “[t]he duty of disclosure defined by 
the code encompasses a duty to investigate.”). 
 130 See Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1048 (noting “[t]hat the lawyer forgot to run a conflict 
check or had forgotten that he had previously represented the party is not an excuse.”). 
 131 Am. Bar Assn’n, The Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes 
Canon II(C)–(D) (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/dispute/commercialdisputes. 
pdf. 
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disclosure.”132  As such, the AAA / ABA Code can be somewhat 
confusing.133 
At face value, it appears that an arbitrator, without doubt, must 
disclose any conflicts to ensure impartiality.  In order to have a 
worthwhile disclosure, an arbitrator should affirmatively conduct an 
investigation into possible conflicts of interest by running a conflict 
check.134  Because the AAA / ABA Code merely recommends, and does 
not require, disclosure and investigation, one is left with the suggestion 
that an arbitrator can be a passive participant regarding a conflict, thus 
potentially undermining an affirmative duty to investigate.  Ultimately, 
however, by recommending that an arbitrator should at least make some 
effort to ascertain any potential conflicts of interest, the AAA / ABA 
Code is a small, but important step toward an affirmative and free-
standing duty to investigate.  It is also quite illustrative of the 
uncertainties and difficulties surrounding arbitrator impartiality. 
B.  The International Bar Association Guidelines 
The IBA Guidelines are more helpful in establishing an arbitrator’s 
duty to investigate possible conflicts.  In fact, the IBA Guidelines 
recommend an affirmative and free-standing duty to investigate.135  The 
focal point of the IBA Guidelines regarding a duty to investigate centers 
around “General Standard 7: Duty of Arbitrator and Parties.”136  General 
Standard 7 explicitly states that “[a]n arbitrator is under a duty to make 
reasonable inquiries to investigate any potential conflicts of interest, as 
well as any facts or circumstances that may cause his or her impartiality 
or independence to be questioned.”137  Furthermore, General Standard 7 
posits that ignorance is no excuse if an arbitrator fails to investigate a 
potential conflict.138  As a result, the IBA Guidelines squarely place a 
                                                                                                             
 132 Id. at Canon II(B) and II(D). 
 133 See Larson, supra note 12, at 900 (noting that “because of [the Code’s] 
inconsistent language, an arbitrator might be confused regarding disclosure requirements 
even when one looks exclusively to a single authority.”). For instance, Canon II(A) states 
that arbitrators “should . . . disclose” any interests or relationships that could give rise to a 
conflict, but Canon II(C) indicates that the “obligation to disclose” the aforementioned 
interests or relationships is a “continuing duty which requires” an arbitrator “to disclose, 
as soon as practicable . . . any such interests or relationships which may arise.” (emphasis 
added). 
 134 ABA / AAA Code of Ethics at Canon II(B). 
 135 IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, General 
Standard 7(c), approved on May 22, 2007, by the Council of the International Bar 
Association, available at http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid 
=e2fe5e72-eb14-4bba-b10d-d33dafee8918. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
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duty to investigate on the arbitrator.139  Interestingly, the IBA Guidelines 
also place a similar duty to investigate on the parties and/or potential 
parties to the arbitration proceeding.140  The IBA Guidelines are quite 
notable in that they make the arbitrator and the parties responsible for 
ensuring the impartiality and fairness of the arbitration proceeding by 
conducting an investigation into potential conflicts of interest.  Indeed, 
they are unique, especially in the international commercial litigation 
context.141  Consequently, the implications are quite straightforward: an 
arbitrator possesses an affirmative and independent duty to investigate 
potential conflicts and disclose his or her findings.142 
Unlike the FAA or other arbitration rules, the aforementioned 
model guidelines are, as previously indicated, not binding.  However, the 
clear distinction between the guidelines and the rules is quite noticeable.  
Under governing arbitration rules, there essentially is no affirmative duty 
to investigate.  Yet under several model guidelines, an arbitrator does 
have an affirmative duty to investigate.  If an amendment to the 
arbitration statutes themselves—particularly the FAA, such that an 
arbitrator would be required to conduct an investigation into potential 
conflicts—is not forthcoming any time in the near future, then it is 
apparent that the entire arbitration process needs a new approach to 
award vacatur based upon evident partiality. 
                                                                                                             
 139 Id. at Explanation to General Standard 7 (stating that [i]t is the arbitrator or 
putative arbitrator’s obligation to make . . . enquiries and to disclose any information that 
may cause his or her impartiality or independence to be called into question.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 140 Id. at Explanation to General Standard 7 (stating that “any party or potential party 
to an arbitration is, at the outset, required to make a reasonable effort to ascertain and to 
disclose publicly available information that . . . might affect the arbitrator’s impartiality 
and independence.”). 
 141 Compare the IBA Guidelines (recommending an affirmative duty to investigate) 
with the American Arbitration Association’s International Arbitration Rules, which 
posits no free-standing affirmative duty to investigate (stating that “[a]rbitrators acting 
under these Rules shall be impartial and independent. Prior to accepting appointment, a 
prospective arbitrator shall disclose to the administrator any circumstance likely to give 
rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality or independence.”). See Am. 
Arbitration Ass’n, International Arbitration Rules art. 7, P 1 (2008), available at 
http://adr.org/sp.asp?id=33994#INTERNATIONAL%20ARBITRATION%20RULES. 
 142 See Peter L Michaelson, In International Arbitration, Disclosure Rules at the 
Place of Enforcement Matter Too, DISP. RESOL. J., Nov. 2007–Jan. 2008, available at  
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qu3923/is_200711/ai_n21279144/pg_6. See also Lee 
Korland, Comment: What an Arbitrator Should Investigate and Disclose: Proposing a 
New Test for Evident Partiality Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 53 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 815, 837 (2003) (proposing an affirmative defense based on an arbitrator’s lack of 
knowledge after making a reasonable investigation into potential conflicts). 
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V. A PROCESS REEVALUATION 
A.  Why Change is Needed: Party Self-Determination 
Because the arbitrator impartiality calculus imposed by courts is 
generally based upon an objective standard, measured not by the actual 
arbitrator’s beliefs, but by a “reasonable person” standard, a new 
approach to evident partiality is needed.  Only by imposing an 
affirmative free-standing duty to investigate on an arbitrator can one 
achieve any measure of objectivity.  Otherwise, one is left with the 
inherent subjectivity of what an arbitrator knows or should have known, 
predicated upon the actions the arbitrator did take or should have taken.  
Giving credence to the intertwined notions of freedom of contract and 
party self-determination, the parties themselves should evaluate an 
arbitrator’s partiality instead of the arbitrator himself or herself.143  In this 
regard, imposing an affirmative duty to investigate can be evaluated from 
a public policy standpoint. It is more sensible for an arbitrator to bear the 
burden of making the requisite inquiries into potential conflicts than it is 
for the parties to run the risk of a partial arbitrator and ultimately, a 
biased award with less than certain judicial recourse. 
If, for example, an arbitrator subjectively believed that no conflict 
of interest existed, yet failed to investigate and there was indeed a 
conflict of interest, then the award will be subject to vacatur based on 
nondisclosure of information the arbitrator constructively knew.  Where, 
however, an arbitrator has an affirmative duty to investigate into 
potential conflicts of interest—a routine conflict check prior to the 
commencement of an arbitration—the situation changes drastically.  
Assuming the arbitrator does investigate, then there will be either no 
conflicts or a potential conflict; but since the arbitrator would disclose 
his or her findings to the parties, the parties could either waive the 
conflict or request a new arbitrator.  In either case, the parties are the 
ultimate judges of an arbitrator’s impartiality, and they will not be left 
wondering if they have all the information needed to make an informed 
decision.144  Subjectivity is thus removed from the picture, and the goal 
of objectivity is achieved.  Hence, an affirmative duty to investigate, 
similar to what the Ninth Circuit utilizes, is a useful tool in solving the 
evident partiality problem. 
                                                                                                             
 143 See Judge Wiener’s dissent in Positive Software Solutions, Inc. v. New Century 
Mortgage Corp., 476 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 144 See Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1048 (citing Justice White’s concurrence) (noting that 
“Commonwealth Coatings establishes that the parties rather than the arbitrators or the 
courts should be the judges of the partiality of arbitrators.”). 
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B.  The Evident Partiality Dilemma and its Implications 
It is apparent from an examination of judicial interpretations of 
evident partiality under the FAA and of several arbitration model 
guidelines that the field of arbitration faces a conundrum, both on a 
domestic and international scale.  On one hand, arbitration is 
theoretically meant to serve the goals of impartiality, finality, efficiency, 
and cost-effective dispute resolution.145  However, when those goals are 
not achieved (which occurs when an award is vacated based upon 
evident partiality), it is quite clear that the integrity of the arbitration 
process is called into question.  When an award is vacated, what was 
once meant to be a final decision becomes no longer final, what was 
supposed to be an efficient manner of resolving a dispute turns into a 
battle in the courtroom, and what was intended to be a cost-effective 
process yields a very high price tag for all parties involved in 
litigation.146 
Because this problem affects the entire process of arbitration, the 
solution must be one that supports and fosters the integrity of the process 
as a whole.  Admittedly, no easy solution exists—that much is apparent 
from the divergence of judicial interpretation on evident partiality.147  
Yet what is undoubtedly needed is a reevaluation of the arbitration 
process.  Specifically, a reevaluation of an arbitrator’s duty to the 
arbitration process, to the parties, and to society is warranted. Only by 
changing the lens through which one views arbitration can any sort of 
solution emerge.  Instead of looking at arbitration as being comprised of 
individual components, evaluated on an ad-hoc basis, if one views 
arbitration holistically, it becomes apparent that change is an absolute 
must.  Otherwise, arbitration becomes simply another avenue into the 
courtroom and serves a limited purpose. 
C.  The Imposition of an Affirmative Duty to Investigate 
Many commentators have observed the arbitrator evident partiality 
dilemma, and some have suggested ways in which arbitration can and 
cannot be changed.148  What appears to be missing from the calculus is 
                                                                                                             
 145 See 9 US NITA prec § 1 (2008). 
 146 Not only monetarily speaking, but also in terms of time spent in the course of the 
arbitration. 
 147 See 4 AM. JUR. 2D Alternative Dispute Resolution § 138 (2008). 
 148 See Korland, supra note 142, at 816, 823, 837 (noting that “[t]he law gets even 
murkier when considering whether an arbitrator has a duty to investigate potential 
conflicts of interest prior to hearing a case,” suggesting utilization of ANR Coal Co. v. 
Cogentrix of North Carolina, Inc.’s four prong test for evaluating evident partiality, and 
proposing an affirmative defense based on an arbitrator’s lack of knowledge of a conflict 
after making a reasonable investigation into the matter); Larson, supra note 12, at 881 
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an evaluation, if not suggestion, of imposing a legal affirmative duty on 
an arbitrator to investigate potential conflicts prior to the commencement 
of the arbitration proceeding.149  By imposing such an affirmative duty 
on the arbitrator, the evident partiality problem could be alleviated, if 
nothing else.  Currently, it is merely the arbitrator’s ethical duty to 
voluntarily undertake an investigation into any conflicts.150  In other 
words, an arbitrator may or may not take such affirmative action.  
Instead, an affirmative duty to investigate should be a legal mandate, for 
an arbitrator’s failure to conduct a conflict check runs the serious risk of 
making an inadequate disclosure to the parties and of a finding of evident 
partiality, thus undermining the integrity of the arbitration process. 
An affirmative duty to investigate ultimately stems from an 
arbitrator’s ethical duty to the system and to the parties: that the 
arbitrator is impartial and that the arbitration proceeding will similarly be 
conducted in an impartial manner.  A lawyer owes his or her client the 
duty of loyalty.151  That duty prohibits a lawyer from undertaking 
representation of another that is directly adverse to his or her client 
without the client’s informed consent.152  A lawyer, prior to undertaking 
representation of a client, is advised to run a conflict check in order to 
ascertain any conflicts of interest.153  And, as previously mentioned, a 
judge must adhere to a strict standard of impartiality.  Such judicial 
impartiality requires disqualification in any proceeding where the judge’s 
                                                                                                             
(concluding that “[a] call for the courts to adopt a more uniform standard for determining 
when a failure to disclose a conflict of interest will result in evident partiality warranting 
vacatur may not be answered any time soon.”); Robertson, supra note 48, at 28 
(lamenting that “until the Supreme Court breaks its almost 40 years of silence, vacatur 
based on an arbitrator’s failure to disclose will continue to be betwixt and between.”). 
 149 See Korland, supra note 145, at 817. Korland proposes that arbitrators “should be 
encouraged, but not legally compelled” to undertake an investigation. Id. 
 150 See, e.g., JACQUELINE M. NOLAN-HALEY, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN A 
NUTSHELL 179–80 (2d ed. 2001) (noting that “[a]rbitrators act in a quasi-judicial capacity 
. . . arbitrators must avoid both the appearance and reality of conflict of interest and 
uphold the integrity and fairness of the arbitration process. It is important that potential 
arbitrators make a reasonable inquiry to determine whether any existing or prior 
financial, professional, family or social relationships might create an appearance of bias. 
If so, they should disclose this information in order to preserve the integrity of the 
arbitration process.”). 
 151 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 6 (2003). 
 152 Id. 
 153 See Charles F. Forer, Ensuring Conflict-Free ADR, THE METRO. CORPORATE 
COUNSEL, August 2000, at 14 (“A lawyer customarily ‘runs a conflict check’ as soon as a 
prospective new client is on the horizon. But what about running a conflict check on the 
person who has been selected to provide neutral mediation or arbitration services?”  Forer 
ultimately, and sadly, concludes that “the parties should not rely on the proposed neutral 
to make his or her own conflict-determinations” and thus the parties should run a conflict 
check on the arbitrator. ). 
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impartiality “might reasonably be questioned.”154  So too must an 
arbitrator run a conflict check to ensure his or her own impartiality: the 
arbitrator must undertake an investigation into potential conflicts of 
interest and disclose his or her findings to the parties.  Since an arbitrator 
acts in a quasi-judicial capacity, his or her conflict check should include 
an investigation into categories such as: any relationship between the 
arbitrator and the parties; any past or present dealings between the 
arbitrator and the parties’ attorneys; any financial, social, or professional 
affiliation / interest between the arbitrator and a party or attorney in the 
arbitration; and any relationship or interest between the arbitrator’s 
family members and the parties or the parties’ attorneys to the dispute.155  
Any limitations on the investigation, such as where the arbitration 
involves a multitude of parties and a conflict check would be 
overwhelming and unrealistic, must similarly be disclosed to the parties 
beforehand.  While the above categories may or may not be exhaustive, 
the idea is to put as much information in the parties’ hands as possible, 
thus allowing them to make an informed decision in either accepting the 
arbitrator or requesting the appointment of a different arbitrator. 
D.  Procedural Features of a Duty to Investigate 
Procedurally speaking, the imposition of an affirmative duty to 
investigate is admittedly difficult to establish.  It could theoretically be 
achieved in several ways.  First, one could impose an affirmative duty 
via an amendment to the FAA that would explicitly require an arbitrator 
to conduct an investigation in order to ensure impartiality.  Given that the 
Supreme Court has declined to resolve any of the evident impartiality 
murkiness, one might conclude that in terms of statistical probability an 
amendment to the FAA is more likely to occur.156  Realistically, 
however, an amendment to the FAA is an unlikely option.157 
                                                                                                             
 154 See supra note 42. 
 155 Id.  These categories are not new. See, e.g., 28 USC § 455 (2008): Disqualification 
of Justice, Judge, or Magistrate.  See also Chernick & Taylor, supra note 4, at 186 
(referencing California Ethics Standards Standard 7).  Worth noting, California adopted 
the most comprehensive and extensive state law on arbitrator disclosure, requiring a 
proposed arbitrator to disclose information dating back five years, as required under 
California Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.9(a). 
 156 See Robertson, supra note 48. 
 157 See James Hosking et al., Unintended Consequences of Proposed Amendments to 
Federal Arbitration Act, International Law Office, Jan. 8, 2009, available at 
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=e4b5b897-d7f5-4b0f-
a0c1-04c059527baa (last visited Feb. 20, 2009) (noting that “[s]ince they were enacted in 
1925, most of the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act have not changed.”). 
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Second, since the Ninth Circuit appears to be moving in the 
direction of imposing an affirmative duty on an arbitrator,158 the courts 
could uniformly adopt an affirmative duty to investigate.  While this 
solution appears ideal and sufficiently warranted, it is obviously not the 
current standard.159  As long as the courts interpret and evaluate evident 
partiality in different ways, the judicial approach to evident partiality will 
likely remain piecemeal and unsatisfactory. 
At a bare minimum, all arbitrators need to voluntarily undertake an 
investigation into potential conflicts in order to make the requisite 
disclosures to the parties.  There may not be a perfect solution, or even 
an easy solution, to imposing this duty.  Nonetheless, the need for an 
affirmative duty to investigate remains.  The parties to an arbitration 
need to be assured that the arbitrator is impartial.  And, society in general 
needs to be assured of the integrity of the arbitration process.  Such 
assurances can only come about if an arbitrator possesses a legal and 
affirmative duty to investigate conflicts of interest.  Even if most 
arbitrators currently run conflict checks as part of their normal practice, 
not all arbitrators do so.  In the end, crossing one’s fingers and hoping 
that all arbitrators run a conflict check prior to the start of an arbitration 
proceeding is, unfortunately, a futile endeavor.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Leaving evident partiality in its current state is unsatisfactory and 
untenable.  From the state courts to the circuit courts, there is a myriad of 
judicial interpretations and approaches to evident partiality.160  There is 
no uniform standard, thus leaving courts to examine evident partiality on 
a case-by-case basis.161  Under the current framework, an arbitrator’s 
“subjective good faith” is clearly not the defining criterion.162  Yet, even 
an arbitrator’s constructive knowledge can give rise to evident 
partiality.163 
To eliminate the subjective disconnect between what an arbitrator 
knows or should know in order to make a sufficient disclosure, an 
                                                                                                             
 158 See New Regency Prod., Inc. v. Nippon Herald Films, Inc., 501 F.3d 1101 (9th 
Cir. 2007); Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1043. 
 159 See Steven Smith et al., International Commercial Dispute Resolution, 42 INT’L 
LAW 363, 368–69 (2008) (“The Second Circuit’s refusal to impose a free-standing duty 
to investigate seems at odds with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in New Regency, which 
found an affirmative duty to investigate when a change in circumstances could potentially 
create conflicts.”). 
 160 See supra Part I. 
 161 Id. 
 162 Applied Indus. Materials Corp., 492 F.3d at 139.  
 163 Schmitz, 20 F.3d at 1049. 
2009] ARBITRATOR EVIDENT PARTIALITY 217 
affirmative duty to investigate is needed.  An arbitrator’s ethical duty to 
investigate potential conflicts needs to become a positive, legal mandate.  
While some arbitrators might find an affirmative duty to investigate 
time-consuming and redundant (after all, an arbitrator is obliged to make 
disclosures to the parties in the first place), in order to make an adequate 
disclosure, an arbitrator must first investigate into any potential conflicts.  
That is the only way an arbitrator can objectively know if there are any 
conflicts which might affect his or her impartiality.  And, that is the only 
way in which the parties can be assured that their neutral will truly be 
neutral.  An affirmative duty to investigate is a critical part of the evident 
partiality equation.  It ensures impartiality in the here and now, and it 
fosters and upholds the integrity of the arbitration process for the future. 
